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Numerous proposals for reorganizing the Intelligence Community or redefining the role of the DCI have lately been aired in public discussions. They range from separating the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of CIA to creation of some kind of "tsar" for all national intelligence. It is not clear from most discussions what objectives motivate the desire for change. Some proposals seem to spring from the desire to achieve greater control over potentially aberrant behavior of the sort that has dominated the news in the last two years. Some seem to believe that a DCI separate from CIA could control CIA without being "captured" by it.

Control of abuses has probably been about as effectively assured as organization can accomplish through critical examination, legal restrictions, and government oversight. The much more enduring problem of national intelligence has been efficient and effective management of tight resources: How do we get the most of the right kinds of intelligence for our money? This problem has been on the national agenda for more than a decade. Important steps toward easing it were attempted or achieved in 1971, 1973, and 1976.

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Did the steps implemented in 1976 go far enough? The Executive Order 11905 more clearly than ever before defined the responsibility of the DCI for a rational and consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program and Budget. It also created a committee mechanism, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), whereby the DCI could negotiate toward this goal mainly with the Department of Defense (DOD), relying for support on an augmented Intelligence Community Staff.

Under present arrangements, the DCI has direct executive control over the CIA Program (CIAP) [REDACTED]

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The Department of Defense is in direct executive control of [REDACTED] of the NFIP. Meanwhile, the DOD has taken steps to streamline and centralize in the Office of the Secretary its control over its dominant fraction of the NFIP. Some of these steps are likely to carry over into the new Administration, although personalities will change, and it appears that DOD will not have a Deputy Secretary whose sole responsibility rests in intelligence matters. However, the next DCI is likely to have to wrestle his Community resource management task on these unequal terms unless changes are made.

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It is time to consider seriously the option of placing the DCI in direct, executive control over the "commanding heights" of the national intelligence community: CIA, the [] and the National Security Agency (NSA). Moving these latter two activities out of the DOD and under the DCI would give the DCI direct control over [] percent of the NFIP. Although peopled heavily with military personnel, [] NSA are avowedly national intelligence functions. They represent the lion's share of national intelligence expenditures on intelligence collection and processing.

The DCI's foremost problem in Community resource management is to establish and enforce the optimal distribution of resources among the national intelligence collection disciplines and to achieve a sound balance between collection and other intelligence activities, such as analysis. During 1976 the CFI mechanism made progress toward this goal. But it remains an exceedingly difficult task to accomplish by committee, especially when one member, DOD, controls so much intelligence stock, but when that stock is only a small fraction of DOD's total budgetary concern. With direct control over the "commanding heights" of national intelligence, the DCI would have much more freedom of maneuver; he could much more expeditiously examine and

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affirm or alter the basic resource patterns that establish the effectiveness of the total program for which the President and the Congress hold him totally accountable.

25X1 Placement of [] and NSA directly under the DCI would require Presidential administrative action and, in the case of NSA, possibly legislation. The DOD would be expected to raise strenuous objections out of fear that its intelligence needs would be slighted in the future. But the DCI would certainly be charged, as he now is, to shape a National Foreign Intelligence Program that meets defense needs as well as those of other consumers of intelligence. With added authority, he could actually meet those needs more efficiently.

25X1 [] can easily be made subordinate to the DCI. []

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25X1 [] Such a move with respect to NSA might seem more difficult because it is much larger, it is funded within DOD through the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, and it operates in close cooperation with SIGINT elements organic to the services and military commands. But administrative obstacles should not be made to appear as persuasive objections. NSA subordination to the DCI would not preclude close collaboration with service SIGINT elements or assignment to NSA of service personnel.

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Consolidating CIA, [] and NSA under the DCI would be a dramatic change in the Intelligence Community. But it would not create a monolith. Some collection activities would continue to be managed by the DOD; e.g., the [] service cryptologic elements, and defense attaches. Defense would still have a strong interest in influencing the total shape of the NFIP. This would dictate retention of the CFI as a mechanism for assuring total rationality of the NFIP and its responsiveness to the very large intelligence needs of Defense. Neither would this consolidation create a monolith with respect to intelligence analysis and estimative judgment. DIA, service intelligence staffs, State/INR, Treasury, the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would continue to be important intelligence producers, as they are now. The nation needs a diversity of intelligence judgment and wisdom. Through the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the DCI could assure that it is supplied.

Numerous additional issues and arguments, pro and con, can be advanced. The important point is that the time for grappling with them is now when some institutional flexibility exists and the management of national intelligence is a matter of national concern.